

MOP: An Efficient and Generic Runtime Verification Framework *

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Abstract

Monitoring-Oriented Programming (MOP¹) [20, 17, 21, 18] is a formal framework for software development and analysis, in which the developer specifies desired properties using definable specification formalisms, along with code to execute when properties are violated or validated. The MOP framework automatically generates monitors from the specified properties and then integrates them together with the user-defined code into the original system.

The previous design of MOP only allowed specifications without parameters, so it could not be used to state and monitor safety properties referring to two or more related objects. In this paper we propose a *parametric specification-formalism-independent extension of MOP*, together with an implementation of JavaMOP that supports parameters. In our current implementation, parametric specifications are translated into AspectJ code and then weaved into the application using off-the-shelf AspectJ compilers; hence, MOP specifications can be seen as formal or logical aspects.

Our JavaMOP implementation was extensively evaluated on two benchmarks, Dacapo [14] and Tracematches [9], showing that runtime verification in general and MOP in particular are feasible. In some of the examples, millions of monitor instances are generated, each observing a set of related objects. To keep the runtime overhead of monitoring and event observation low, we devised and implemented a *decentralized indexing* optimization. Less than 8% of the experiments showed more than 10% runtime overhead; in most cases our tool generates monitoring code as efficient as the hand-optimized code. Despite its genericity, JavaMOP is empirically shown to be more efficient than runtime verification systems specialized and optimized for particular specification formalisms. Many property violations were detected during our experiments; some of them are benign, others indicate defects in programs. Many of these are subtle and hard to find by ordinary testing.

1. Introduction

Runtime verification [29, 43, 11] aims at combining testing with formal methods in a mutually beneficial way. The idea underlying runtime verification is that system requirements specifications, typically formal and referring to temporal behaviors and histories of events or actions, are rigorously checked at runtime against *the current* execution of the program, rather than statically against all hypothetical executions. If used for bug detection, runtime verification gives a rigorous means to state and test complex temporal requirements, and is particularly appealing when combined with test case generation [5] or with steering of programs [35]. A large number of runtime verification techniques, algorithms, formalisms, and tools such as Tracematches [2], PQL [38], PTQL [27], MOP [18], Hawk/Eraser [22], MAC [35], PaX [28], etc., have been and are still being developed, showing that runtime verification is increasingly adopted not only by formal methods communities, but also by programming language designers and software engineers.

We present a parametric extension together with a mature, optimized and thoroughly evaluated implementation of monitoring-oriented programming (MOP). MOP was first proposed in 2003 [20] as a software development and analysis framework based on runtime verification intuitions and techniques. It was further described and extended in [17, 21, 18], but, up to now, it was not able to handle parameters in specifications, and was not shown, through large-scale performance tests measuring run-time overhead, to be feasible in practice. An implementation of JavaMOP was carried out to support these, together with decentralized monitor indexing algorithms for reducing the runtime overhead.

As shown in this paper, MOP is expressive, generic, and efficient. MOP *logic-plugins* encapsulate monitor synthesis algorithms for logics of interest; these allow users comfortable with formal notation to declare properties using high-level or application-specific requirements specification formalisms. Specifications using any of the logic-plugins are allowed to have parameters; this way, multiple monitor instances for the same property can coexist, one per collection of objects of interest. MOP also allows its users to implement monitors manually, using the full strength of the target language. In other words, MOP supports and encourages the use of formal specifications, but it does not require it. Since the safety properties are precisely the monitorable ones [42], MOP can therefore handle any safety property.

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¹ Not to be confused with “meta-object protocol” [34].

```

class Resource {
/*@
  scope = class
  logic = PTLTL
  {
    event authenticate: end(exec(* authenticate()));
    event access: begin(exec(* access()));
    formula: access -> <*> authenticate;
  }
  violation handler { @this.authenticate(); }
*/
void authenticate() {...}
void access() {...}
...
}

```

Figure 1. MOP specification for resource safety

1.1 Examples

Let us consider a simple and common safety property for a shared resource, namely that any access to the resource should be authenticated. For simplicity, suppose that all the operations on the shared resource are implemented in the class `Resource`, including methods `access()` and `authenticate()`. Then the safety property can be specified as a trivial “always past” linear temporal logic (LTL) formula over method invocations, namely

`access -> <*> authenticate`,

stating that “if `access` then `authenticate` held in the past” (“`<*>`” reads “eventually in the past”); the “always” part is implicit, since MOP properties are continuously monitored.

Using MOP like in Figure 1, one can *enforce* this policy to hold in any system that manages the resource via the `Resource` class; by “enforce” we mean that MOP ensures that the system will satisfy the property even though it was not originally programmed (intentionally or not) to satisfy it.

The first line of the MOP specification in Figure 1 states that this property is a class invariant, i.e., it should hold in the scope of this class (specification attributes are discussed in Section 4.1). The second line chooses a desired formalism to express the corresponding formal requirement, in this case past-time LTL (PTLTL); MOP allows users to “plug-and-play” new specification formalisms, provided that they respect the standardized interface of logic-plugins (these are discussed in Section 3.1). The content enclosed by the curly brackets is specific to the chosen formalism. For PTLTL, the user needs to first build an abstraction that maps runtime events into logical elements, e.g., the invocation of `authenticate()` being mapped to an event `authenticate`. Using the elements produced by the abstraction, a PTLTL formula is given to describe the desired property. The last part of the MOP specification contains the code that will be triggered when the specification is violated and/or validated. It may be as simple as reporting errors, or as sophisticated as taking recovery actions to correct the execution to avoid crashes of the system. In this example, when the safety property is violated, i.e., when some access is not authenticated, we enforce the authentication simply by making a call to `authenticate()`. The MOP tool is able to analyze this specification, generate monitoring code for the

```

/**MonitorAspect**/
public aspect MonitorAspect {
  /** Generated by JavaMOP for javamop.monitor PTLTL_0 */
  public boolean[] Resource.PTLTL_0_pre = new boolean[1];
  public boolean[] Resource.PTLTL_0_now = new boolean[1];
  pointcut PTLTL_0_Init(Resource thisObject):
    execution(Resource.new(..)) && target(thisObject);
  after(Resource thisObject): PTLTL_0_Init(thisObject) {
    boolean authenticate = false;
    boolean access = false;
    thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0] = authenticate;
  }
  pointcut PTLTL_0_authenticate0(Resource thisObject):
    target(thisObject) && execution(* Resource.authenticate());
  after (Resource thisObject) returning:
    PTLTL_0_authenticate0(thisObject) {
    boolean authenticate = false;
    boolean access = false;
    authenticate = true;
    thisObject.PTLTL_0_pre[0] = thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0];
    thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0] = authenticate ||
      thisObject.PTLTL_0_pre[0];
    if (access && ! thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0]){
      thisObject.authenticate(); }
  }
  pointcut PTLTL_0_access0(Resource thisObject):
    target(thisObject) && execution(* Resource.access());
  before (Resource thisObject):
    PTLTL_0_access0(thisObject) {
    boolean authenticate = false;
    boolean access = false;
    access = true;
    thisObject.PTLTL_0_pre[0] = thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0];
    thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0] = authenticate ||
      thisObject.PTLTL_0_pre[0];
    if (access && ! thisObject.PTLTL_0_now[0]){
      thisObject.authenticate(); }
  }
}
/* Generated code ends */
}

```

Figure 2. Generated monitor for the property in Figure 1

formula, and insert the monitor with the recovery handler into appropriate points of the program.

There are two important observations regarding the example above, each reflecting a crucial aspect of MOP:

1. By synthesizing monitoring code from specifications and automatically integrating it together with the recovery code at relevant points in the program, the developer can and should have quite a *high confidence that the resource is used correctly* throughout the system. In fact, if we trust that the MOP tool generates and integrates the monitoring code correctly, then we can also trust that the resulting system is correct w.r.t. this safety property, no matter how complicated the system is.
2. Suppose that authentication-before-access was not a requirement of the system originally, but that it became a desired feature later in the development process (e.g., because of a larger number of clients). Suppose also that, as a consequence, one wants to add authentication to an initial implementation of the system that provided no support and no checking for authentication. Using MOP, all one needs to do is to add an (unavoidable) `authenticate()` method, together with the MOP specification in Figure 1. This way, the MOP specification together with its violation handler *added non-trivial functionality* to the system, in a fast, elegant and correct way.

```

/*@
scope = class
logic = ERE
{
  [static int counter = 0; int writes = 0;]
  event open : end(call(* open(...)) {writes = 0;};
  event write : end(call(* write(...)) {writes ++};
  event close : end(call(* close(...));
  formula : (open write write* close)*
}
violation handler{ @RESET; }
validation handler{ synchronized(getClass()){
  File.log(++counter) + ":" + writes; } }
/*@

```

Figure 3. MOP specification for file profiling

Monitors corresponding to specifications may need to observe the execution of the program at many different points, which can be scattered all over the system. In this sense, every monitor can be regarded as a crosscutting feature, like in aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [33]. MOP can be regarded as a specialized instance of AOP, in which *aspects are (formal) specifications*. Existing AOP tools provide crucial support for MOP to integrate generated monitoring code as well as recovery code into the system. From this point of view, MOP acts as a *supplier of aspects*: it converts specifications into concrete aspects that can be handled by existing AOP tools. For instance, our MOP front-end for Java discussed in Section 3.2, JavaMOP, translates the specification in Figure 1 into the AspectJ code in Figure 2 (that code is further compiled using off-the-shelf AspectJ compilers).

Comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2, one can see that MOP provides an abstract programming environment, hiding underlying implementation details. Low-level error-prone tasks such as transforming formulae into monitors or choosing appropriate join points to integrate monitors and recovery code are all automatically handled by the MOP framework; this way, the user is freed to focus on the interesting and important aspects of the system.

The example above shows an “event-harmless” MOP specification, i.e., one that executes no auxiliary code when events are observed (except running the generated monitor), with a violation handler encapsulating all desired recovery code. Figure 3 depicts a more intrusive MOP specification with both violation and validation handlers, also showing how MOP can be used for profiling. The logic-plugin used this time is for extended regular expressions (ERE), that is, regular expressions extended with complement (no complement is needed here, but the ERE plugin generates optimal monitors also for ordinary regular expressions).

Two auxiliary variables are defined as part of the MOP specification, a static counter and a per-object writes. The desired pattern to profile is (open write+ close)*, that is, how many times we see an open followed by one or more writes followed by a close. Each open event resets the writes, which is then incremented at each write event. The validation handler, which in the case of EREs is triggered whenever the automaton monitor reaches its final state, logs the writes and increments the static counter; note that this

```

/*@
scope = global
logic = ERE
SafeEnum (Vector v, Enumeration+ e) {
  [String location = ""];
  event create<v,e>: end(call(Enumeration+.new(v,...)) with (e);
  event updatesource<v>: end(call(* v.add(...)) \ /
    end(call(* v.remove(...)) \ / ...
    {location = @LOC;});
  event next<e>: begin(call(* e.nextElement()););
  formula : create next* updatesource updatesource* next
}
validation handler { System.out.println("Vector updated at "
+ @MONITOR.location); }
/*@

```

Figure 4. MOP specification for safe enumeration

handler needs to synchronize on the class to avoid potential races. The violation handler, which for EREs is triggered whenever the automaton monitor cannot advance to a next state (in our case, that most likely happens when a file is open then closed without any writes), resets the monitor to its initial state using the MOP reserved command @RESET.

Both MOP specifications above are class scoped: they refer to behaviors of individual objects. There are, however, many safety properties of interest that refer to collections of two or more objects. Some of these are considered so important that language designers feel it appropriate to include corresponding runtime safety checks as built-in part of programming languages. For example, Java 5 raises a `ConcurrentModificationException` when running

```

Vector v = new Vector();
v.add(new Integer(10));
Iterator i = v.iterator();
v.add(new Integer(20));
System.out.println(i.next());

```

That is because the Iterators returned by Vector’s iterator methods are assumed *fail-fast* in Java: the Vector is not allowed to be modified while the Iterator accesses its elements. However, the Enumerations returned by Vector’s `elements` method are *not* assumed fail-fast in Java 5, and, obviously, neither are any other user-defined iterator-like objects. One can easily imagine many other similar tight relationships among two or more objects, either language-specific as above or application-specific. For example, a security policy in an application can be: for any password p , string s and file f , it is never the case that s is the decrypted version of p (as returned by some decrypt method) and s is written on f .

To support such important properties referring to groups of objects, MOP now provides a generic mechanism allowing for *universal parameters* to requirements specified using any of the logic-plugins. Figure 4 shows an MOP specification making enumeration objects corresponding to vectors also fail-fast. Note that this time the MOP specification is globally scoped, because it refers to more than one object. The property to check, which is also given an optional name here, `SafeEnum`, has two parameters: a Vector v and an Enumeration+ e ; the “+” says that the property (and its monitors) is inherited by all subclasses of Enumeration.

The event `create<v,e>` is parametric in both v and e , and is generated whenever enumeration e is created for

vector v . The event `updatesource<v>` is generated when methods that modify the vector are called; to save space, we did not list all of them in Figure 4. The location (file and line number) of the update is also stored in the variable `location`, using the MOP reserved variable `@LOC`. An ERE formula expresses the faulty pattern: an `updatesource` event is seen after `create` and before a `next`; events in this pattern are assumed parameterized as above.

The validation handler here simply reports the location where the vector was wrongly updated (this info is useful for debugging); the MOP reserved keyword `@MONITOR` gives a reference to the corresponding monitor instance, which has the declared monitor variables (only `location` here) as fields. MOP will create as many monitors for this property as corresponding instances of v and e are generated during the execution of the application, and will dispatch the events correspondingly; for example, if several enumerations are created for the same vector v , then an `updatesource<v>` event is sent to each instance monitor corresponding to each enumeration of v . JavaMOP generates about 200 lines of AspectJ code from the specification in Figure 4.

1.2 Contributions

As already mentioned, the basic idea of MOP and a first JavaMOP prototype have already been discussed in several places [20, 17, 18, 21]. However, the previous design and implementation of MOP lacked parameters and thus had limited practical use. In particular, the safe enumerator example in Figure 4, the examples supported by other runtime verification systems such as Tracematches [2], PQL [38] and PTQL [27], as well as most of the examples in Sections 6 were previously not possible to define in MOP using formal specifications. Our contributions in this paper are:

(1) Universal parameters, decentralized indexing

We present a generic technique to add *universal parameters* to trace-based logics, together with an optimized implementation based on *decentralized indexing*. Logical formalisms used in runtime verification and monitoring have traces as models; in particular, all our MOP logic-plugins are trace-based. However, existing runtime verification systems supporting parametric properties use centralized monitors and indexing, that is, all monitors are stored in a common pool and parametric events are resolved and dispatched at this centralized level, incurring unavoidable runtime overhead when the pool contains many objects. Our decentralized indexing technique is logic-independent, so it can be adopted by any runtime verification system. As empirically shown in Section 6, despite its genericity wrt logical formalisms, MOP with decentralized indexing is more efficient than the current state-of-the-art runtime verification systems specialized and optimized for particular trace-based logics.

(2) New MOP language, raw MOP specifications

We defined a new MOP specification language, which allows not only specification of parametric properties using

MOP logic-plugins, but also definition of *raw MOP specifications*. Raw MOP specifications require no logic-plugin and consequently no logical formula, so they need to be explicitly implemented by users in the target language (e.g., Java); in this case, the MOP framework provides a useful abstraction allowing users to define monitor variables and/or event actions, to generate and handle violation or validation signals, to use MOP reserved keywords and commands, etc.; the developer of raw MOP specifications can fully utilize the strength of the target language. Raw MOP specifications may be preferred by users who are not comfortable with formal notation. We use them to write hand-optimized monitors for the experiments in Section 6. Due to its new enriched specification language, MOP now captures many other runtime verification frameworks as specialized instances (these are discussed in Section 2); this genericity comes at no performance penalty (on the contrary). Therefore, MOP is now a viable generic platform for runtime verification projects, allowing experimentation with new logics for monitoring, safety policies, monitor synthesis algorithms, and so on.

(3) Evaluation and Experiments

A large number of experiments have been carried out to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of MOP: we used JavaMOP to check more than 100 property-program pairs. The results are encouraging: in most cases, the runtime overhead was negligible; only 8% of experiments showed noticeable slow-down of 10% or more. In some purposely designed extreme cases, the runtime overhead was still less than 200%, but we were able to write raw MOP specifications for the same properties, reducing the overhead below 30%. We did not focus on error detection, in the sense that no test generation techniques were used. However, many violations of specified properties were revealed; some of these are benign (but still interesting to be aware of), others indicate possible defects of programs: an inappropriate usage of `StringWriter` leads to a write-after-close violation in Xalan [44]; possible resource leaks in Eclipse [24] GUI packages; a violation of `SafeEnum` caused by concurrency in `jHotDraw` [32]; etc. (see Section 6.2). These subtle problems are difficult to detect using ordinary testing, but JavaMOP provided good support to locate their root causes. Our experiments show that runtime verification in general and MOP in particular are feasible and effective in practice. Both JavaMOP and the experiments are publicly available at [19].

2. Related Work

We next discuss relationships between MOP and other related paradigms, including AOP, design by contract, runtime verification, and other trace monitoring approaches. Broadly speaking, all the monitoring approaches discussed below are runtime verification approaches; however, in this section only, we group into the runtime verification category only those approaches that explicitly call themselves runtime verification approaches. Interestingly, even though most of the

systems mentioned below target the same programming languages, no two of them share the same logical formalism for expressing properties. This observation strengthens our belief that probably there is *no silver bullet logic* (or *super logic*) for all purposes. A major objective in the design of MOP was to avoid hardwiring particular logical formalisms into the system. In fact, as shown in Sections 3 and 4, MOP specifications are generic in four orthogonal directions:

MOP[logic, scope, running mode, handlers].

The logic answers *how to specify* the property. The scope answers *where to check* the property; it can be class invariant, global, interface, etc. The running mode answers *where the monitor is*; it can be inline, online, offline. The handlers answer *what to do if*; there can be violation and validation handlers. For example, a particular instance can be

MOP[ERE, global, inline, validation],

where the property is expressed using the ERE logic-plugin for extended regular expressions (EREs), the corresponding monitor is global and inline, and validation of the formula (pattern matching in this case) is of interest.

Most approaches below can be seen as such specialized instances of MOP for particular logics, scopes, running modes and handlers. There are, of course, details that make each of these approaches interesting in its own way.

2.1 Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) Languages

Since its proposal in [33], AOP has been increasingly adopted and many tools have been developed to support AOP in different programming languages, e.g., AspectJ and JBoss [31] for Java and AspectC++ [4] for C++. Built on these general AOP languages, numerous extensions have been proposed to provide domain-specific features for AOP. Among these extensions, Tracematches [2] and J-LO [15] support history(trace)-based aspects for Java.

Tracematches enables the programmer to trigger the execution of certain code by specifying a regular pattern of events in a computation trace, where the events are defined over entry/exit of AspectJ pointcuts. When the pattern is matched during the execution, the associated code will be executed. In this sense, Tracematches supports trace-based pointcuts for AspectJ. J-LO is a tool for runtime-checking temporal assertions. These temporal assertions are specified using LTL and the syntax adopted in J-LO is similar to Tracematches except that the formulae are written in different logics. J-LO mainly focuses on checking at runtime properties rather than providing programming support. In J-LO, the temporal assertions are inserted into Java files as annotations that are then compiled into runtime checks. Both Tracematches and J-LO support parametric events, i.e., free variables can be used in the event patterns and will be bound to specific values at runtime for matching events.

Conceptually, both Tracematches and J-LO can be captured by MOP, because both regular expressions and LTL are supported in MOP. In fact, their regular patterns and tempo-

ral assertions can be easily translated into MOP specifications that contain only action events and validation handlers. Moreover, in addition MOP provides class-scoped properties, outline and offline monitor settings, and more. Fixing a logic allows for developing static analysis and logic-specific optimizations. We have not attempted to devise any logic-specific optimizations yet in MOP, because we do not regard MOP's runtime overhead as a bottleneck yet. In Section 6, we show that the MOP instance MOP[ERE, class/global, inline, validation] using decentralized indexing adds significantly less runtime overhead than Tracematches with static analysis enabled². It is also worth mentioning that Tracematches and J-LO are implemented using Java bytecode compilation and instrumentation, while MOP acts as an aspect synthesizer, making it easier to port to different target languages provided that they have AOP tool support.

2.2 Runtime Verification

In runtime verification, monitors are automatically synthesized from formal specifications, and can be deployed *offline* for debugging, or *online* for dynamically checking properties during execution. MaC [35], PathExplorer (PaX) [28], and Eagle [12] are runtime verification frameworks for logic based monitoring, within which specific tools for Java – Java-MaC, Java PathExplorer, and Hawk [22], respectively – are implemented. All these runtime verification systems work in outline monitoring mode and have hardwired specification languages: MaC uses a specialized language based on interval temporal logic, JPaX supports just LTL, and Eagle adopts a fixed-point logic. Java-MaC and Java PathExplorer integrate monitors via Java bytecode instrumentation, making them difficult to port to other languages. Our approach supports inline, outline and offline monitoring, allows one to define new formalisms to extend the MOP framework, and is adaptable to new programming languages.

Temporal Rover [23] is a commercial runtime verification tool based on future time metric temporal logic. It allows programmers to insert formal specifications in programs via annotations, from which monitors are generated. An Automatic Test Generation (ATG) component is also provided to generate test sequences from logic specifications. Temporal Rover and its successor, DB Rover, support both inline and offline monitoring. However, they also have their specification formalisms hardwired and are tightly bound to Java.

Although our current JavaMOP prototype does not support all these techniques yet, it is expected that all the RV systems would fall under the general MOP architecture, provided that appropriate logic-plugins are defined.

²There is a subtle difference between the MOP ERE logic-plugin and Tracematches: the monitoring code generated by the ERE plugin checks the specified property against the *entire execution* trace, while Tracematches matches *partial traces*.

2.3 Design by Contract

Design by Contract (DBC) [39] is a technique allowing one to add semantic specifications to a program in the form of assertions and invariants, which are then compiled into runtime checks. It was first introduced by Meyer as a built-in feature of the Eiffel language [25]. Some DBC extensions have also been proposed for a number of other languages. Jass [13] and jContractor [1] are two Java-based approaches.

Jass is a precompiler which turns the assertion comments into Java code. Besides the standard DBC features such as pre-/post-conditions and class invariants, it also provides refinement checks. The design of trace assertions in Jass is mainly influenced by CSP [30], and the syntax is more like a programming language. jContractor is implemented as a Java library which allows programmers to associate contracts with any Java classes or interfaces. Contract methods can be included directly within the Java class or written as a separate contract class. Before loading each class, jContractor detects the presence of contract code patterns in the Java class bytecode and performs on-the-fly bytecode instrumentation to enable checking of contracts during the program's execution. jContractor also provides a support library for writing expressions using predicate logic quantifiers and operators such as *Forall*, *Exists*, *suchThat*, and *implies*. Using jContractor, the contracts can be directly inserted into the Java bytecode even without the source code.

Java modeling language (JML)[36] is a behavioral interface specification language for Java. It provides a more comprehensive modeling language than DBC extensions. Not all features of JML can be checked at runtime; its runtime checker supports a DBC-like subset of JML, a large part of which is also supported by JavaMOP. Spec# [10] is a DBC-like extension of the object-oriented language C#. It extends the type system to include non-null types and checked exceptions and also provides method contracts in the form of pre- and post-conditions as well as object invariants. Using the Spec# compiler, one can statically enforce non-null types, emit run-time checks for method contracts and invariants, and record the contracts as metadata for consumption by downstream tools.

We believe that the logics of assertions/invariants used in DBC approaches fall under the uniform format of our logic engines, so that an MOP environment following our principles would naturally support monitoring DBC specifications as a special methodological case. In addition, our MOP design also supports outline monitoring, which we find important in assuring software reliability but which is not provided by any of the current DBC approaches that we are aware of.

2.4 Other Related Approaches

Acceptability-oriented computing [40] aims at enhancing flawed computer systems to respect basic acceptability properties. For example, by augmenting the compiled code with bounds checks to detect and discard out-of-bound

memory accesses, the system may execute successfully through attacks that trigger otherwise fatal memory errors. Acceptability-oriented computing is mainly a philosophy and methodology for software development; one has to devise specific solutions to deal with different kinds of failures. We do believe though that MOP can serve as a platform to experiment with and support acceptability-oriented computing, provided that appropriate specification formalisms express the “acceptability policy” and appropriate recovery ensures that it is never violated.

Program Query Language (PQL) allows programmers to express design rules that deal with sequences of events associated with a set of related objects [38]. Both static and dynamic tools have been implemented to find solutions to PQL queries. The static analysis conservatively looks for potential matches for queries and is useful to reduce the number of dynamic checks. The dynamic analyzer checks the runtime behavior and can perform user-defined actions when matches are found, similar to MOP handlers.

PQL has a “hardwired” specification language based on context-free grammars (CFG) and supports only inline monitoring. CFGs can potentially express more complex languages than regular expressions, so in principle PQL can express more complex safety policies than Tracematches. There is an unavoidable trade-off between the generality of a logic and the efficiency of its monitors; experiments performed by Tracematches colleagues [6] and confirmed by us (see Section 6) show that PQL adds, on average, more than twice as much runtime overhead as Tracematches. We intend to soon take a standard CFG-to-pushdown-automata algorithm and to implement it as an MOP logic-plugin; then MOP will also support (the rare) CFG specifications that cannot be expressed using parametric extended regular expressions or temporal logics, and MOP[CFG,global,inline,validation] will provide an alternative and more general implementation of PQL.

Program Trace Query Language (PTQL) [27] is a language based on SQL-like relational queries over program traces. The current PTQL compiler, Partique, instruments Java programs to execute the relational queries on the fly. PTQL events are timestamped and the timestamps can be explicitly used in queries. PTQL queries can be arbitrary complex and, as shown in [27], PTQL's runtime overhead is acceptable in many cases; however, it can sometimes slow-down programs hundreds of times. PTQL properties are globally scoped and their running mode is inline. PTQL provides no support for recovery, its main use being to detect errors. It would be interesting to investigate the possibility of developing an SQL logic-plugin for MOP and then to compare the corresponding MOP instance to Partique.




Figure 5. MOP architecture

3. Overview of MOP and JavaMOP

We here briefly introduce MOP and JavaMOP. Interested readers are referred to [18, 17] for more details, and also to [19] for tool downloads and the latest development news.

3.1 MOP: An Extensible Monitoring Framework

MOP separates monitor generation and monitor integration by adopting the layered architecture in Figure 5. This architecture is especially designed to facilitate extending the MOP framework with new formalisms or new programming languages. By standardizing the protocols between layers, new modules can be added easily and independently. Modules on lower layers can be reused by upper-level modules.

The topmost layer, called the *interface layer*, provides user friendly programming environments. For example, the reader is encouraged to try the web-based interface for JavaMOP at [19] (no download needed, examples provided). The second layer contains *specification processors*, which handle monitor integration. Each specification processor is specific to a target programming language and consists of a program scanner and a program transformer. The scanner extracts MOP specifications from the program and dispatches them to appropriate modules on the lower layer to process. The transformer collects the monitoring code generated by the lower layer and integrates it into the original program. AOP plays a critical role here: the program transformer synthesizes AOP code and invokes AOP compilers to merge the monitors within the program. In particular, as discussed in Section 3.2, JavaMOP transforms generated monitoring code into AspectJ code.

The two lower layers contain the *logic-plugins*, which allow the user to add, remove, or modify specification formalisms. Logic-plugins are usually composed of two modules: a *language shell* on the third layer and a *logic engine* on the bottom layer. The former generates programming language and specification formalism specific monitoring code in a standardized format, which can be understood by the specification processor on the upper layer. The logic engine, acting as the core of monitor generation, synthesizes mon-

itors from specifications in a programming language independent way, e.g., as state machines. This way, logic engines can be reused across different programming languages.

3.2 JavaMOP

JavaMOP is an MOP development tool for Java. It provides several interfaces, including a web-based interface, a command-line interface and an Eclipse-based GUI, providing the developer with different means to manage and process MOP specifications. To flexibly support these various interfaces, as well as for portability reasons, we designed JavaMOP following a client-server architecture (see [18]) as an instance of the general MOP architecture in Figure 5. The client part includes the interface modules and the JavaMOP specification processor, while the server contains a message dispatcher and logic-plugins for Java. The specification processor employs AspectJ for monitor integration. In other words, JavaMOP translates outputs of logic-plugins into AspectJ code, which is then merged within the original program by the AspectJ compiler. The message dispatcher is responsible for the communication between the client and the server, dispatching requests to corresponding logic-plugins. The communication can be either local or remote, depending upon the installation of the server.

An immediate advantage of this architecture is that one logic server can provide and cache monitor generation services, which can require intensive computation, to multiple clients. Also, our clients are implemented in Java to run on different platforms, while some of the logic engines are implemented in non-conventional languages and consequently run best on Linux or Unix. Therefore, this architecture increases portability, since the client and the server are allowed to run on different platforms; also the server can cache monitors for common formulae.

Four logic-plugins are currently provided with JavaMOP: Java Modeling Language (JML) [36], Extended Regular Expressions (ERE) and Past-Time and Future-time Linear Temporal Logics (LTL) (see [18] for more details).

4. The MOP Specification Language

MOP provides a specification language to define safety properties. The design of this language was driven by two factors: uniformity in supporting different formalisms and languages, and the ability to control monitor behaviors. Language-specific and logic-specific notations are carefully distinguished from other notations in MOP specifications. The developer is also given the possibility to directly *program* the monitor if she/he wants to fully control the monitoring process (see Section 4.4). The MOP specification language can be regarded as a specialized AOP language, tuned to support specifying monitors either formally using logics or informally by programming.

MOP specifications can be either embedded into the source code as special annotations or stored in separate

files. Each format has different advantages. Annotations are more suitable for properties related to specific positions in the source code, e.g., assertions and pre-/post-conditions for methods. On the other hand, separate specification files are conceptually clearer when their corresponding properties refer to multiple places in the program, e.g., global properties. JavaMOP supports both kinds of specifications.

```

<Specification> ::= /*@ <Header> <Body> <Handlers> @*/
<Header> ::= <Attribute>*[scope = <Scope>][logic = <Logic>]
<Attribute> ::= static | outline | offline | centralized | sync
<Scope> ::= global | class | interface | method
<Name> ::= <Identifier>
<Logic> ::= <Identifier>
<Body> ::= [<Name>][(<Parameters>)]{<LogicSpecificContent>}
<Parameters> ::= ( <Type> <Identifier> )+
<Handlers> ::= [<ViolationHandler>] [<ValidationHandler>]
<ViolationHandler> ::= violation handler { <Code> }
<ValidationHandler> ::= validation handler { <Code> }

```

Figure 6. Syntax of MOP specifications

Figure 6 shows the syntax of MOP specifications. An MOP specification is composed of three parts: the header, the body and the handlers. We next discuss each of these.

4.1 Header: Controlling Monitor Generation and Integration

The header contains generic information to control monitor generation and integration, consisting of optional attributes, the scope, and the name of the formalism (or logic-plugin) used in the specification.

Attributes are used to configure monitors with different installation capabilities. They are orthogonal to the actual monitor generation but determine the final code generated by the MOP tool. Four attributes are available. One is *static*, which has an effect only upon class/interface scoped properties, and says that the specification refers to the class, not to the object. For a static specification, only one monitor instance is generated at runtime and is shared by all the objects of the corresponding class. By default, monitors are non-static, meaning that objects will be monitored individually. In JavaMOP, the variables used to represent the state of the monitor are added to the corresponding class as either static or non-static fields, according to staticness of the monitor; inserting new class fields is done through the inter-type member declaration of AspectJ (e.g., the declaration of `Resource.PTTLTL_0_pre` in Figure 2). To avoid name conflicts, these fields are renamed by the specification processor.

Two other attributes, *outline* and *offline*, are used to change the running mode of the monitor. Different properties may require different running modes. For example, a monitor can be executed in the context (thread) of the monitored system, or it can run outside of the monitored system, as a standalone process or thread. We call the former an *inline* monitor, which is also the default mode of the specification,

and the latter an *outline* monitor. An inline monitor can interact with the system directly, facilitating information retrieval and error recovery, but some problems, e.g., deadlocks, cannot be detected by inline monitors. Besides, inline monitors may cause significant runtime overhead when running the monitor involves intensive computation. An outline monitor provides a better solution for such cases. In the outline mode, the monitored system sends messages that contain relevant state information to the monitor. However, communication with outline monitors may reduce the performance of the system and, equally importantly, an outline monitor cannot access the internal state of the monitored system, limiting its capability for error recovery.

Another way to check an execution trace, which can sometimes make expensive monitoring feasible by allowing random access to the trace, is offline monitoring: log the trace in a file and make it available to the “monitor”. Since such monitors can run after the monitored system ceases, they are called *offline* monitors. Offline monitors are suitable for properties that can be decided only after the system stops or properties that require a backward traversal of the trace; they may also be useful for debugging and analysis.

These running modes impose different requirements on monitor synthesis. In JavaMOP, inline monitors are merged into the program by encapsulating the monitoring code as an aspect, such as the example in Figure 1 and Figure 2. For outline and offline monitors a standalone monitor class is synthesized, which can run independently as a new thread or process. The MOP tool then generates aspects containing either message passing code (in outline mode) or event logging code (in offline mode).

Another important attribute, named *centralized* from “centralized indexing”, can only be combined with global parametric specifications. The default indexing is “decentralized” in MOP, that is the references to monitors are piggybacked into states of some objects in order to reduce the runtime overhead. This technique is discussed in Section 5. As seen also in Section 6, there are situations when a centralized pool of monitors is more suitable; we therefore allow the users the possibility to choose *centralized* indexing.

The last attribute, *sync*, is used to generate synchronized monitoring code. It should also only be used with global parametric specifications. More specifically, our indexing technique for global parametric specifications replies on maps and/or lists of monitors that can be shared by multiple threads. For multi-threaded programs, the *sync* attribute needs to be specified to generated monitoring code that accesses monitors in a synchronized and safe way.

The **scope** of specifications defines the working scope of monitors, determining the points where properties are checked. Five scopes are supported: *global*, *class*, *interface*, *method*, and a default scope. Properties which are *global* may involve multiple components/objects in the system. The scope *class* says that the property is a class invari-

ant; both global and class properties are checked when the involved fields are updated or the involved methods are called. The scope `interface` denotes a constraint on the interface, and is checked at every observable state change, i.e., on boundaries of public method calls; MOP interface-scoped properties are therefore similar to class invariants in JML [36]. The scope `method` is used to specify constraints on the designated method: pre-, post-, and exceptional conditions. The default scope is “assertion” or “check point”: the generated monitoring code replaces the specification and is therefore checked whenever reached during the execution.

The **logic name** designates the formalism to use in the specification and also identifies the corresponding logic-plugin. Logic-plugins should have different names. Presently, the following logic names can be used in JavaMOP: JML, ERE, FTLTL and PTLTL. If no logic is designated, the specification is regarded as a *raw MOP specification*, where the user provides his/her own code to monitor the desired property. This is explained in detail in Section 4.4.

4.2 Body: Describing Properties

The body of an MOP specification defines the desired property, and is sent to the corresponding logic-plugin by the specification processor. It starts with an optional name and an optional list of parameters. The name, if provided, can be useful for documentation purposes or as a reference; otherwise, the MOP tool will generate a unique internal name. The parameters can only be combined with global properties. MOP provides a generic, logic-independent way to add parameters to specifications, discussed in Section 5.

Considering the diversity of specification formalisms, it is difficult, and also undesirable, to design a uniform syntax for all possible formalisms. So the syntax of the specification body varies with the underlying formalism. For JML, we adopted its original syntax. Since formalisms used to express properties over traces, such as ERE and LTL, show many common features, we designed a general syntax for all of them, shown in Figure 7. However, one should not regard this language as the only option supported by the MOP framework for trace properties. On the contrary, one can design and use her/his specification languages in the MOP framework by providing appropriate logic-plugins. In our language, the body is composed of an optional block for local variable declarations, a list of event definitions and a formula specifying the desired property.

In this specification language, an execution trace is abstracted as a sequence of events generated dynamically. Events usually correspond to concrete actions, e.g., invocation of certain methods or updates of some variables, and contain relevant information about the state of the program, e.g., values of accessed variables. Every event is regarded atomic and *unique*. In other words, two events are different even when they are generated at the same point. When two events are generated at the same point, the user should

```

<LogicBody> ::= [[<VarDeclaration>]] <Event>* [<Formula>]
<Event> ::= <EventHeader> : <EventDecl> [{<Code>}];
<EventHeader> ::= event <Identifier> [<Parameters>];
<EventDecl> ::= <EventPoint> [with (<Type> <Name>)] [&& <BExp>]
<EventPoint> ::= (begin | end) (<EventPattern>)
<EventPattern> ::= (call|exec) (<Method>) | update (<Field>)
<Formula> ::= formula : <LogicFormula>

```

Figure 7. MOP syntax for trace-based logic formalisms

not assume any pre-determined order between them, even though the underlying instrumentation mechanism, e.g., AspectJ, may impose some implementation-specific ordering. Properties of traces are then defined in terms of events. For example, the property specified in Figure 1 involves two types of events, namely, the end of the execution of `authenticate()` and the beginning of the execution of `access()`. Our current login-plugins generate monitoring code that checks the specified property against the *entire trace*. Definitions of events are orthogonal to the particular formalism used to specify the property.

Events are related to entries and exits of actions during the execution. An action can be one of: calling a method (in the caller’s context), executing a method (in the callee’s context), and updating a variable. A `with` clause can be attached to an event to fetch the return value of the event, i.e., the value returned from a method call or a variable update. In parametric specifications, events can be parametric; the event parameters, if any, must be a subset of the parameters of the specification. A boolean expression can be associated with each event, acting as a condition: the event is generated only if the boolean expression evaluates to true.

To capture the defined events at runtime, MOP tools need to statically insert the monitors at appropriate points in the original program. AOP plays a critical role here: the MOP tool chooses instrumentation points according to the event definitions and then uses the AOP compiler to integrate the monitor into the program. In order to ease the translation from event definitions to join points in AOP, the syntax of the `<Method>` and `<Field>` may adopt the syntax of the employed AOP tool. For example, JavaMOP uses AspectJ syntax.

Events can be used as atoms in formulae. During monitor synthesis, the language shell extracts and sends the formula to the logic engine, which then generates the monitoring code from the formula. The monitor generated by the logic engine can use some pseudo code that is independent of any specific programming language. It will then be translated into the target language by the language shell. Therefore, the syntax of the formula varies with the formalisms. No formula is needed for raw MOP specifications.

The developer can declare local variables in the specification and associate actions to event definitions. The declared variables are called *monitor variables* and are only visible inside the monitor. They can be used in event actions and in handlers. The usage of monitor variables are different from

the specification parameters: the specification parameters are bound only when the present event contains the corresponding information, while the monitor variables are part of the monitor state. Therefore, one needs to avoid using specification parameters in handlers unless the parameter is guaranteed to be bound when the handler is triggered. A safer way is to use monitor variables to store those parameters needed in the handlers. *Event actions* can be any code and are executed upon occurrences of the corresponding events. Using monitor variables and event actions, one can specify more complex properties and implement more powerful handlers. For example, one may add counters into regular expressions to express properties like AB^3A .

The combination of monitor variables and event actions provides a very strong programming mechanism for the user to write “functional” specifications, that is, specifications that do more than just monitoring the execution. However, event actions should be used with cautions since it might interfere the monitored system, and the user is encouraged to use harmless specifications, i.e., those specifications that do not change the state of the monitor program, for monitoring purposes. In fact, we allow arbitrary event actions in this specification language just to illustrate the full strength of the MOP framework; with the extensible MOP framework, one can easily devise a more restricted specification language that allows only harmless event actions, e.g., simple assignments of monitor variables, to reduce the potential risk of inappropriate monitoring.

4.3 Handlers: Taking Actions

MOP users can provide special code to be executed when the property is violated or validated. Although many errors are related to violations, sometimes it is easier to define patterns of erroneous behaviors (e.g., patterns of security attacks): the match, or validation, of the pattern means “error”. In MOP, handlers can be associated not only to violations but also to validations of properties. Even though handlers support runtime error recovery, they need not necessarily be “error recovery” code. An MOP specification can therefore be regarded as a complex branch statement with the specified property (which can refer to past and future events) as the condition and the handlers as true/false branches.

The handlers use the target programming language and will be part of the generated monitoring code. Since monitors are synthesized and integrated into the program after one writes the handler code, the handlers do not have full access to information about the context in which the monitor will be executed. To mitigate this problem, MOP provides several built-in variables and commands: `@this` refers to the current object; `@RESET` resets the state of the monitor to the initial state; `@LOC` refers to the current location (file and line number) – different events take place at different locations. These variables are replaced with appropriate values or pieces of code during monitor synthesis. For example, `@this` in Figure 1 is renamed to `thisObject` in Figure 2.

```

/*@
scope = global
{
[Set taintedStrings = new HashSet();]
event userInput :
    end(call(String ServletRequest.getParameter(...))
        with (String tainted)
    { taintedStrings.put(tainted); }
event propagate :
    end(call(StringBuffer StringBuffer.new(String s))
        with (StringBuffer newS)
    \ end(call(StringBuffer StringBuffer.append(String s))
        with (StringBuffer newS)
    ...
    { if (taintedStrings.contains(s))
        taintedStrings.put(newS.toString()); }
event usage :
    begin(call(* Statement.executeQuery(String s)))
    { if taintedStrings.contains(s) Util.checkSafeQuery(s); }
}
/*@

```

Figure 8. Raw MOP specification for SQL injection

4.4 Raw MOP Specifications

MOP encourages the use of logical formalisms to specify desired system behaviors concisely and rigorously. However, there are cases where one may want to have full control over the monitoring process; for example, some properties can be difficult or impossible to specify using existing logical formalisms, or existing logic-plugins generate inefficient monitoring code. Moreover, there may be developers who wish to benefit from monitoring but who are not trained to or are not willing to write formal specifications, preferring instead to use the programming language that they are familiar with.

MOP supports *raw specifications* to implement and control the monitoring process exclusively by ordinary programming, without any reference to or use of logic formalisms and/or logic-plugins. As an example, Figure 8 shows a raw MOP specification that detects SQL-injection attacks [3]: malicious users try to corrupt a database by inserting unsafe SQL statements into the input to the system.

In SQL injection, a string is “tainted” when it depends upon some user input; when a tainted string is used as a SQL query, its safety should be checked to avoid potential attacks. In Figure 8, a `HashSet` is declared to store all tainted strings. Three types of events need to be monitored: `userInput` occurs when a string is obtained from user input (by calling `ServletRequest.getParameter()`); `propagate` occurs when a new string is created from another string; finally, `usage` occurs when a string is used as a SQL query.

Appropriate actions are triggered at observed events: at `userInput`, the user input string is added to the tainted set; at `propagate`, if the new string is created from a tainted string then it is marked as tainted, too; at `usage`, if the query string is tainted then a provided method, called `Util.checkSafeQuery`, is called to check the safety of the query. Thus the safety check, which can be an expensive operation, is invoked dynamically, on a by-need basis. In particular, for efficiency and separation of concerns reasons, a developer may even ignore the SQL injection safety aspect

when writing code; the raw MOP specification above will take care of this aspect entirely.

This example shows that the event/action abstraction provided by raw MOP specifications is easy to master and useful for defining interesting safety properties compactly and efficiently. Event names were not needed here, so they could have been omitted. No formulae or violation/validation handlers are needed in raw MOP specifications; the developer fully implements the monitoring process by providing event actions using the target programming language.

All logical MOP specifications can be translated into raw specifications; in other words, each specification formalism can be regarded as *syntactic sugar* within the raw MOP specification language. MOP thus provides a focused and expressive AOP language for specifying safety properties and enforcing them by means of monitoring and recovery. However, the correctness of raw specifications is solely based on the capability of the developer to understand and implement the safety requirements. Formal specifications and their corresponding logic-plugins, on the other hand, can be assumed (and even formally proved) to generate correct monitoring code for the specified property. In Section 6 we use raw MOP specifications to implement “hand-optimized” monitors.

5. Adding Parameters to Specifications

As discussed in Section 1.1, many safety properties of interest in OO applications refer to groups of objects rather than to individual objects. It is, however, a nontrivial matter to support and efficiently monitor such parametric specifications. A natural solution is to use powerful logics that allow universally quantified formulae $(\forall x)\varphi$ and to treat parametric specifications as particular formulae universally quantified over the parameters. The challenge that techniques based on this “super-logic” approach face is how to synthesize an efficient monitor from a universally quantified formula. Several runtime verification systems follow this approach explicitly or implicitly, including Eagle/Hawk [22], Tracematches [2], and PQL[38]. MOP does *not* prevent the logic designer from employing logics with universal quantifiers: once a logic-plugin is implemented for such a logic, the logic can be immediately used to specify parametric properties in MOP. For example, Eagle or the publicly available monitoring algorithms of PQL and Tracematches can be organized as MOP logic-plugins with little effort.

Synthesizing *efficient* monitors from formulae in logics allowing quantification is hard. Such monitors need to keep track of all the instances of all the quantified variables. Large hash tables or other similar structures may need to be generated, nested, garbage-collected and accessed multiple times per event, making it difficult to maintain an acceptably low runtime overhead in real-life applications. Even if one disallows nested quantifiers in formulae and even if one knows how to monitor an unquantified formula φ efficiently, it is still non-trivial to monitor the quantified formula $(\forall x)\varphi$.




Figure 9. Centralized indexing for MOP spec in Figure 4

We next describe a novel *logic-independent* technique to support universal, non-nested parameters in specifications using any trace-related logics with *no need* to modify the existing monitoring generation algorithm. One is then able to write parametric specifications using any of the existing logic-plugins in MOP. One would expect that such a genericity must come at a performance price. However, as shown in Section 6, our generic technique presented next, when used with the ERE logic-plugin, produces significantly less runtime overhead than Tracematches with all its optimizations (including static ones) enabled (see Table 4).

In our solution, a monitor instance checking the specified property will be created for every specific group of values of parameters; if a monitor instance m is created for a group of values containing o , then we say that m is *related* to o . For the SafeEnum specification in Figure 4, a monitor instance will be created for every pair of concrete v and e if e is the enumeration of v . When a relevant event occurs, concrete values are bound to the event parameters and used to look up related monitor instances; related monitors are then invoked to handle the observed event. Several monitors can be triggered by an event since the event may contain fewer parameters than the parameters of the enclosing specification. For the SafeEnum example, when an `updatesource` event occurs, the target Vector object is bound to the parameter v and used to find all the related monitors to process `updatesource` (there may be several enumerations of v).

The monitor lookup process is external to the monitor in our approach and makes no assumption on the implementation of the monitor; consequently, it is independent of the monitor generation algorithm. Also, the monitor does not need to be aware of the parameter information and can proceed solely according to the observed event. Hence, the monitoring process for parametric specifications is divided into two parts in MOP: the logic-specific monitor (generated by the logic plugin) and the logic-independent lookup process (synthesized by the specification processor). Consequently, given any logic-plugin, MOP allows one to write parametric specifications using that logic with no additional effort.

Current runtime verification approaches supporting logics with universal quantifiers construct a centralized monitor

```

Map SafeEnum_v_map = makeMap();
pointcut SafeEnum_updatesource0(Vector v) :
    call(* Vector.add*(...)) && target(v);
after (Vector v) : SafeEnum_updatesource0(v) {
    Map m = SafeEnum_v_map;
    Object obj = null;
    obj = m.get(v);
    if (obj != null){
        Iterator monitors = ((List)obj).iterator();
        while (monitors.hasNext()) {
            SafeEnumMonitor monitor = (SafeEnumMonitor)monitors.next();
            monitor.updateSource(v);
            if (monitor.succeeded()) {
                //validation handler
            }
        }
    }
}

```

Figure 10. Centralized indexing monitoring code generated by JavaMOP for `updatesource` (from spec in Figure 4)

whose state evolves according to the parameter information contained in received events. Our approach, on the contrary, creates many isolated monitor instances, but it maintains indexing information so that it can quickly find relevant monitors. Experiments (Section 6) show that our “decentralized-monitoring” strategy performs overall better than the centralized ones. The rest of this section presents two instances of our decentralized monitoring technique, both supported by JavaMOP: one using centralized indexing and the other using decentralized indexing.

5.1 Centralized Indexing

Efficient monitor lookup is crucial to reduce the runtime overhead. The major requirement here is to quickly locate all related monitors given a set of parameter instances. Recall that different events can have different sets of parameters: e.g., in Figure 4, all three events declare different parameter subsets. Our centralized indexing algorithm constructs multiple indexing trees according to the event definitions to avoid inefficient traversal of the indexes; more specifically, for every distinct set of event parameters found in the specification, an indexing tree is created to map the set of parameters directly into the list of corresponding monitors.

The number and structure of indexing trees needed for a specification can be determined by a simple static analysis of event parameter declarations. For example, for the parametric specification in Figure 4, since there are three different sets of event parameters, namely $\langle v, e \rangle$, $\langle v \rangle$ and $\langle e \rangle$, three indexing trees will be created to index monitors, as illustrated in Figure 9: the first tree uses a pair of v and e to find the corresponding monitor, while the other two map v and, respectively, e to the list of related monitors.

We use hash maps in JavaMOP to construct the indexing tree. Figure 10 shows the generated monitor look up code for the `updatesource` event in Figure 4. This code is inserted at the end of every call to `Vector.add` or other vector changing methods, according to the event definition. One parameter is associated to this event, namely, the vector v on which we invoke the method. A map, `SafeEnum_v_map`, is created




Figure 11. Decentralized indexing for monitor in Figure 9

to store the indexing information for v , i.e., the $\{v\}$ Map in Figure 9. When such a method call is encountered during the execution, a concrete vector object will be bound to v and the monitoring code will be triggered to fetch the list of related monitors using `SafeEnum_v_map`. Then all the monitors in the list will be invoked to process the event.

An important question is when to create a new monitor instance. This is a non-trivial problem in its full generality, because one may need to create “partially instantiated” monitors when events with fewer parameters are observed before events with more parameters. While this partial instantiation can be achieved in a logic-independent manner, motivated by practical needs we adopted a simpler solution in JavaMOP: we let the logic-plugin tell which events are allowed to create new monitors; these events are also required to be parametric by all the specification parameters, such as the `create<v, e>` event in Figure 4. All MOP’s logic-plugins have been extended to mark their monitor-initialization events. Thus, if an event is generated and a monitor instance for its parameters cannot be found, then a new monitor instance is created for its parameters only if the event is marked; otherwise the event is discarded. This way, no unnecessary monitor instances are created; indeed, it would be pointless and expensive to create monitor instances for all vector updates just because they can be potentially associated with enumerations – monitor instances are created only when enumerations are actually created.

A performance-related concern in our implementation of JavaMOP is to avoid memory leaks caused by hash maps: values of parameters are stored in hash maps as key values; when these values are objects in the system, this might prevent the Java garbage collector from removing them even when the original program has released all references to them. We use weakly referenced hash maps in JavaMOP. The weakly referenced hash map only maintains weak references to key values; hence, when an object that is a key in the hash map dies in the original program, it can be garbage collected and the corresponding key-value pair will also be removed from the hash map. This way, once a monitor in-

stance becomes unreachable, it can also be garbage collected and its allocated memory released.

The correctness of our monitor removal strategy, i.e., a monitor will be destroyed *only* when it is known that it will never be needed in the future, is guaranteed by the structure of indexing trees. Since we have an indexing tree per event parameter set, if a monitor m can potentially be triggered in the future by some event e with parameter set (p_1, \dots, p_n) , where n can also be 0, then:

1. Monitor m appears in the indexing tree corresponding to the parameters (p_1, \dots, p_n) ; that is also because of our assumption/limitation that, when m is created, all its possible parameters, including p_1, \dots, p_n but potentially more, were available; when m was created, it was added to all the indexing trees corresponding to (subsets of) its parameters, including that of (p_1, \dots, p_n) ; and
2. If e is ever generated in the future, m will be referred from the indexing tree for (p_1, \dots, p_n) . This is because if e really occurs at some moment in the future, then p_1, \dots, p_n should be live objects and thus the mapping in the corresponding indexing tree has not been destroyed. Therefore, if a future event can ever trigger m , then m is not garbage collected. This guarantees the soundness of our usage of weak references.

One detail is worth noting here: when n is 0, i.e., some event has no parameters, the corresponding indexing tree for the empty set of parameters is actually a list instead of a map. In such case, even if all parameters die, the monitor will still be kept alive because there is a reference to it in that list. But this only happens when at least one of the events in the specification has no parameters.

A similar technique, also called “indexing”, has been proposed and implemented in Tracematches [9]. Both approaches (JavaMOP and Tracematches) make use of parameters as indices in order to speed up the look-up of corresponding monitor information. However, there are some fundamental differences between them. Tracematches uses the automaton corresponding to a pattern as a skeleton for the global monitor. Then each state in the automaton carries indexing information saying which transitions can be applied in that state and for what parameter instances. Therefore, the monitor automata structure appears to be crucial for Tracematches’ approach. In MOP’s indexing mechanism, the structure of the particular monitor plays absolutely no role in indexing; each monitor is viewed as a black-box taking events and potentially producing violation or validation signals. The indexing is kept at the top level and structured down on an event parameter-subset basis; the “little” monitor instances are kept as leaves in these indexing trees.

Therefore, considering the common regular properties, Tracematches’ monitor can be described as “automata at the top, indexing below”, while MOP’s as “indexing at the top, automata below”. The indexing approach adopted by

```

List Vector.SafeEnum_v_List = null;
pointcut SafeEnum_updatesource0(Vector v) :
    call(* Vector.add*(..))&& target(v);
after (Vector v) : SafeEnum_updatesource0(v) {
    if (v.SafeEnum_v_List != null) {
        Iterator monitors = (v.SafeEnum_v_List).iterator();
        while (monitors.hasNext()) {
            SafeEnumMonitor monitor=(SafeEnumMonitor)monitors.next();
            monitor.updateSource(v);
            if (monitor.succeeded()) {
                //validation handler
            }
        } //end of while
    }
}

```

Figure 12. Decentralized indexing monitoring code automatically generated by JavaMOP for updatesource

MOP is exactly what allows us to be logic-formalism- and automata- independent. It is also simpler, because it can make immediate use in a sound way of weak references, which turned out to be a sophisticated task in Tracematches [8].

5.2 Optimization: Decentralized Indexing

The centralized-indexing-decentralized-monitor approach above can be regarded as a centralized database of monitors. This solution proves to be acceptable wrt runtime overhead in many of the experiments that we carried out; in particular, it compares favorably with centralized-monitor approaches (see Figure 13). However, reducing runtime overhead is and will always be a concern in runtime verification. We next propose a further optimization based on decentralizing indexing. This optimization is also implemented in JavaMOP.

In *decentralized indexing*, the indexing trees are piggy-backed into states of objects to reduce the lookup overhead. For every distinct subset of parameters that appear as a parameter of some event, JavaMOP automatically chooses one of the parameters as the *master parameter* and uses the other parameters, if any, to build the indexing tree using hash maps as before; the resulting map will then be declared as a new field of the master parameter. For example, for the updatesource event in Figure 4, since it has only the $\langle v \rangle$ parameter, v is selected as master parameter and a new field will be added to its Vector class to accommodate the list of related monitor instances at runtime. Figure 11 shows the decentralized version of the centralized indexing example in Figure 9, and Figure 12 shows the generated decentralized indexing monitoring code for the updatesource event.

Comparing Figures 12 and 10, one can see that the major difference between the centralized and the decentralized indexing approaches is that the list of monitors related to v can be directly retrieved from v when using decentralized indexing; otherwise, we need to look up the list from a hash map. Decentralized indexing thus scatters the indexing over objects in the system and avoids unnecessary lookup operations, reducing both runtime overhead and memory usage.

On the negative side, decentralized indexing involves more instrumentation than the centralized approach, some-

times beyond the boundaries of the monitored program, since it needs to modify the original signature of the master parameter: for the monitoring code in Figure 12, the library Java class `Vector` has to be instrumented (add a new field). This is usually acceptable for testing/debugging purposes, but may not be appropriate if we use MOP as a development paradigm and thus want to leave monitors as part of the released program. If that is the case, then one should use centralized indexing instead, using the attribute `centralized`.

The choice of the master parameter may significantly affect the runtime overhead. In the specification in Figure 4, since there is a one-to-many relationship between vectors and enumerations, it would be more effective to choose the enumeration as the master parameter of the `create` event. Presently, JavaMOP picks the first parameter encountered in the analysis of the MOP specification as the master parameter for each set of event parameters. Hence, the user can control the choice of the master parameter by putting, for each set of parameters P , the desired master parameter first in the list of parameters of the first event parametric over P .

Decentralized indexing is a natural extension to our previous work on MOP [20]: for one-parameter properties, i.e., class invariants, monitors' states are stored as fields in corresponding objects, while in the context of multiple parameters, objects are used to store indexing information. Also, a similar idea of piggybacking the indexing information into objects states was proposed in [8], called "inter-type declaration", but it has not been implemented so far.

6. Experiments and Evaluation

We have applied JavaMOP on tens of programs, including several large-scale open source programs, e.g., the DaCapo benchmark suite [14], the Tracematches benchmark suite [9], and Eclipse [24]. Our evaluation mainly focuses on two aspects: the expressivity of the specification language and the runtime overhead of monitoring. The properties used in our experiments come from two sources: properties used in other works (e.g., [27, 38, 9, 16]) and our own formalization of informal descriptions in software documentation.

With the currently supported logic-plugins and the generic support for parameters, JavaMOP is able to formally and concisely express most of the collected properties. One interesting exception is the SQL injection from PQL [38], which we implemented using the raw MOP specification shown in Figure 8. A large portion, nearly half, of the properties that we have tried are recoverable/enforceable. Many violations of properties were revealed in our experiments, although we did not focus on error detection; when violations occurred, we were able to quickly locate their causes using JavaMOP.

The rest of this section focuses on performance evaluation, on discussing some of the detected violations, and on current limitations of our implementation.

6.1 Performance Evaluation

The monitoring code generated by JavaMOP caused low runtime overhead, below 10%, in most experiments even with centralized indexing. By turning on the decentralized indexing, few experiments showed noticeable runtime overhead. In what follows, we evaluate JavaMOP's runtime overhead using the DaCapo benchmark, and also compare JavaMOP with other runtime verification techniques, namely, Tracematches and PQL, using the Tracematches benchmark.

Our experiments were carried out on a machine with 1GB RAM and P4 2.0Gz processor; the Sun Java HotSpot(TM) Client VM (1.5.0_10) on Windows XP professional was used as the running JVM. All the benchmark programs and properties discussed in this paper can be downloaded from JavaMOP's website [19].

We used the DaCapo benchmark version 2006-10; it contains eleven open source programs [14]: `antlr`, `bloat`, `chart`, `eclipse`, `fop`, `hsqldb`, `jython`, `luindex`, `lusearch`, `pmd`, and `xalan`. The provided default input was used together with the `-converge` option to execute the benchmark multiple times until the execution time falls within a coefficient of variation of 3%. The average execution time is then used to compute the runtime overhead.

6.1.1 Properties

The following general properties were checked using JavaMOP, which we borrowed from [16]:

1. `SafeEnum`: Do not update a `Vector` while enumerating its elements using the `Enumeration` interface (see Figure 4);
2. `SafeIterator`: Do not update a `Collection` when using the `Iterator` interface to iterate its elements;
3. `HashMap`: The hash code of an object should not be changed when the object is used as a key in a hash map;
4. `HasNext`: Always call the `hasNext()` method of an iterator before calling its `next()` method;
5. `LeakingSync`: Only access a `Collection` via its synchronized wrapper once the wrapper is generated by the `Collections.synchronized*` methods;
6. `ClosedReader`: Do not read from a `Reader` if it or its corresponding `InputStream` has been closed;

More properties have been checked in our experiments; we choose these six properties to include in this paper because they generate a comparatively larger runtime overhead. We excluded those with little overhead. Three of these properties are recoverable: `HashMap` (the monitor can maintain a shadow map based on `IdentityHashMap` as backup), `HasNext` (make a call to `hasNext()` before `next()`), and `LeakingSync` (redirect call to the synchronized wrapper).

For every property, we provided three MOP specifications: an ERE formal specification, the same formal specification for centralized indexing, and a (hand-optimized) raw

MOP specification. The last one is supposedly the best monitoring code for that property and was used to evaluate the effectiveness of our monitor generation algorithm. The AspectJ compiler 1.5.3 (AJC) was used in these experiments to compile the generated monitoring AspectJ code.

6.1.2 Statistics and Results of the Evaluation

Tables 1 and 2 show the instrumentation and monitoring statistics for monitoring the above properties in DaCapo: Table 1 gives the number of points statically instrumented for monitoring each of the properties; Table 2 gives the number of events and the number of monitor instances generated at runtime using centralized indexing. Both these numbers are collected from a single execution of the benchmark. The first row in each table gives the names of the properties, and the first column in Table 2 gives the programs. We do not split the static instrumentation points by different programs because they are merged together in the benchmark suite; some of them even share common packages. Decentralized indexing does not change the number of generated events or monitor instances; it only affects the monitor indexing.

These two tables show that the properties selected in our experiments imposed heavy runtime monitoring on the programs: a large number of points, ranging from one thousand to twelve thousand, in the original programs were instrumented to insert the monitoring code. The monitoring code was frequently triggered during the execution, especially for those properties involving the Java Collection classes, e.g., `SafeIterator`, `HashMap`, and `HasNext`. Some properties generated numerous runtime checks but only a few, even zero, monitor instances were created (e.g., `SafeEnum` and `LeakingSync`). The reason is that these properties observe some frequently visited methods, but the events that we allowed to create monitor instances rarely or never occurred. For example, `LeakingSync` checks all the method calls on the `Collection` interface, but no calls to `Collections.synchronized*` methods happened in these experiments, so no monitor-initialization events were created. Such experiments are particularly useful to evaluate the effectiveness of the generated monitoring code to filter dynamically irrelevant events, i.e., events that have no effect on the current monitor states. Also, a big difference between the number of events and the number of created monitor instances (e.g., `jython-SafeEnum` and `bloat-Leakingsync`) indicates a real potential for static analysis optimizations.

Table 3 summarizes the runtime overhead measured in our experiments, represented as a *slowdown percentage* of the monitored program over the original program. For every property-program combination, three monitoring runtime overhead numbers are given: with centralized indexing, with decentralized indexing, and using a hand-optimized raw MOP specification. Among all 66 experiments (recall that we already excluded some results with little overhead), only 11 (bold) caused more than 10% slow-down with centralized indexing; for the decentralized indexing version, this number

reduces to 4. Except for the 4 worst cases, with decentralized indexing JavaMOP generates monitoring code *almost as efficient as the hand-optimized code*.

Analyzing Tables 3 and 2, one can see that decentralized indexing handles the dynamically irrelevant events much better than centralized indexing, e.g., when checking the `LeakingSync` property. This is caused by the fact that, when there is no related monitor instance, decentralized indexing only checks an object field, while centralized indexing needs to make an expensive hash map lookup. The runtime overhead is determined not only by the frequency of reaching monitoring code, but also by the execution time of the monitored action. For example, `HashMap` required quite heavy monitoring on many programs but did not cause any noticeable performance impact. This is because the methods checked for `HashMap`, including `put`, `remove`, and `contains`, are relatively slow. On the other hand, checking `bloat` and `pmd` against `SafeIterator` and `HasNext` is as bad as it can be: the monitored actions take very little time to execute (e.g., the `hasNext` and `next` methods of `Iterator`) and they are used very intensively during the execution (indicated by the massive numbers in Table 2). Even for such extreme cases, the monitoring code generated by JavaMOP with decentralized indexing may be considered acceptable: slowdown between 2 and 3 times. However, one can always choose to implement a hand-optimized raw MOP specification for the property of interest; in our case, the raw MOP specification reduced the runtime overhead to only 20-30%.

6.1.3 Comparing JavaMOP, Tracematches, and PQL

Attempts have also been made to compare JavaMOP with other existing trace monitoring tools. However, some of them are not publicly available, others have limitations that prevented us from using them in our experiments. Consequently, we only succeeded to compare JavaMOP thoroughly with Tracematches and partially with PQL.

As shown in [6], Tracematches is one of the most efficient and mature trace monitoring tools to date. A benchmark for trace monitoring tools and experiments has been proposed by the Tracematches team in [9], containing eight property-program combinations. Detailed explanations about these properties and programs can be found in [9]; one of them had 0 runtime overhead and apparently was not intended to measure runtime overhead, and it took longer than 1 hour to compile another one using Tracematches, so we stopped it. Table 4 shows the results that we obtained for the other six property-program combinations. These experiments were run on the same machine mentioned above.

In Table 4, the first two columns list the properties and the programs; the third column gives the sizes of the programs; the fourth column shows the running time of the original program without any monitoring; the remaining columns give the runtime overhead caused by hand-optimized monitoring code, (decentralized indexing) JavaMOP monitors, centralized indexing JavaMOP monitors, Tracematches monitors,

	SafeEnum	SafeIterator	HashMap	HasNext	LeakingSync	ClosedReader
DaCapo	1147	5663	1729	2639	12855	2966

Table 1. Instrumentation statistics: instrumentation points in the DaCapo benchmark

	SafeEnum		SafeIterator		HashMap		HasNext		LeakingSync		ClosedReader	
antlr	10K	0	1K	0	0	0	0	0	233K	0	3M	1K
bloat	0	0	90M	1M	391K	46K	155M	1M	6M	0	11K	0
chart	57	0	569K	815	8K	3K	6K	815	653K	0	208	2
eclipse	16K	0	38K	31	31K	19K	1K	31	230K	0	29K	165
fop	7	1	49K	79	17K	6K	277	79	3M	0	1K	3
hsqldb	174	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	686	0	0	0
jython	50K	0	174K	50	443	439	106	50	16M	0	1M	114
luindex	457K	14K	82K	8K	9K	9K	28K	8K	3M	0	19K	0
lusearch	335K	0	405K	0	416	416	0	0	1M	0	2M	0
pmd	717	0	25M	1M	11K	105	46M	8M	26M	0	28K	4
xalan	5K	0	119K	0	124K	78K	0	0	682K	0	98K	1K

Table 2. Monitoring statistics: generated events(left column) and monitor instances(right column). K = $\times 10^3$, M = $\times 10^6$

	SafeEnum			SafeIterator			HashMap			HasNext			LeakingSync			ClosedReader		
antlr	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	22.1	5.8	0.0
bloat	2.4	0.0	0.0	385	176	24.2	2.4	1.8	1.4	323	154	36.3	13.5	3.2	2.2	0.1	0.0	2.3
chart	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	4.8	3.6	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
eclipse	2.4	4.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.4	3.6	3.7	0.5	0.0	3.8	1.5	0.8	3.0	3.1	0.6	2.2	2.4
fop	0.4	1.2	0.6	1.7	1.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.8	1.5	14.7	0.5	1.0	1.9	0.0	0.0
hsqldb	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.9	1.2	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.8	0.0	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.6	0.0	0.0
jython	0.5	0.6	0.0	1.6	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.2	0.3	1.3	0.0	0.6	30.2	0.0	2.3	0.7	0.4	0.2
luindex	2.6	1.6	0.2	3.2	1.9	0.5	0.6	1.2	1.8	0.9	0.3	0.0	4.3	3.2	2.2	1.1	1.7	1.1
lusearch	6.6	0.5	0.0	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	32.4	1.1	0.6	75.7	0.0	0.1
pmd	0.0	0.0	0.0	272	44.8	11.3	0.5	0.0	0.0	353	25.4	13.7	34.3	5.4	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
xalan	0.0	3.5	4.4	4.8	6.7	5.4	7.2	4.7	6.5	4.6	0.0	2.8	3.0	1.5	1.7	8.5	2.2	4.5

Table 3. Runtime overhead (in percentage; e.g., 14.7 means 14.7% slower) of JavaMOP: centralized | indexing | raw

Property	Program	LOC	Original (seconds)	Hand Optimized	MOP (AJC)	MOP-CI (ABC)	TM	PQL
Listener	ajHotDraw	21.1K	1.5	0.0	6.6	7.0	1026.6	2193.3
SafeIterator	jHotDraw	9.5K	67.9	0.1	38.5	45.6	72.6	292.7
NullTrack	CertRevSim	1.4K	0.1	265.9	266.0*	425.5	1229.7	n/a
Hashtable	Weka	9.9K	2.8	3.3	3.3	6.7	10.3	n/a
HashSet	Aprove	438.7K	560.0	21.2	23.9	45.8	296.5	n/a
Rewave	ABC	51.2K	7.0	11.1	17.6*	20.2	63.5	n/a

Table 4. Runtime overhead (in %) for JavaMOP, Tracematches, and PQL on the Tracematches Benchmark. (* : Centralized indexing monitors were used, because decentralized indexing monitors for these properties require instrumentation on non-modifiable classes in Java, e.g., Object and String.)

and PQL monitors. We take no credit for the hand-optimized code: it was implemented by Tracematches developers using AspectJ and offered with the benchmark. The Tracematches properties were also contained in the benchmark package. To achieve a direct comparison, all the MOP specifications used the ERE logic-plugin and were essentially identical to the Tracematches specifications. Both decentralized indexing and centralized indexing in JavaMOP were used. The Tracematches specifications and the centralized indexing monitoring code generated by JavaMOP were compiled with the ABC compiler [7] for AspectJ, while AJC was used to weave the AspectJ code generated by JavaMOP using decentralized indexing. We were not able to use ABC in all experiments because apparently ABC cannot instrument Java library classes, which is required by some of our optimized (decentralized indexing) monitoring code. Due to implementation limitations of PQL, only two properties could be specified using PQL; we could not apply the static analyzer in the PQL distribution due to lack of documentation. From personal communication with a PQL developer, we learned that PQL admittedly causes more runtime overhead than Tracematches (it was not dynamically optimized) and also that its static analyzer is not easy to use.

Table 4 shows that JavaMOP generates more efficient monitoring code than Tracematches and PQL, often close to the hand-optimized code when using decentralized indexing. Aprove monitored by Tracematches produces much more overhead in our evaluation than reported in [9]; this might be caused by the different execution environments. Since JavaMOP generates *standard* AspectJ code, it gives us the freedom to choose off-the-shelf compilers. In our experiments, ABC tended to take more time to compile the code than AJC.

An important advantage of building a runtime verification tool on top of an instrumentation package, like Tracematches and PQL do, is that one can have more control over instrumentation and thus facilitate the use of static analysis. A static analyzer has been recently proposed for Tracematches in [16] and it was also evaluated on the property-program combinations using the DaCapo benchmark discussed in the above section. This allows us to make another comparison, this time between JavaMOP and Tracematches with static analysis. The results are summarized in Figure 13.

Figure 13 compares those examples with more than 10% overhead in Table 3 or more than 20% for Tracematches without static analysis according to [16]. We did not repeat the 16 experiments for Tracematches in our environment, and all the numbers for Tracematches are taken from [16]. Without using static analysis, Tracematches caused less overhead than centralized JavaMOP monitors in four cases (Jython-LeakingSync, lusearch-ClosedReader, pmd-SafeIterator, and pmd-HasNext), and it was always less efficient than decentralized JavaMOP monitors. After using static analysis to eliminate unnecessary instrumentation points, there are still three cases (bloat-SafeIterator, bloat-




Figure 13. Runtime overhead of JavaMOP and Tracematches on DaCapo (CI: centralized indexing; TM: Tracematches; TM-static: TM with static analysis). The runtime overhead is represented as the ratio of monitored execution over non-monitored execution; e.g., 1 means no overhead and 10 means ten times slower.

HasNext, and pmd-HasNext) in which JavaMOP outperformed Tracematches, while for the others both tools were pretty close in performance.

It should be noted that we are not arguing against static analysis; on the contrary, we believe that static analysis can and should be combined with MOP to further reduce the runtime overhead, but that is out of the scope of this paper.

6.2 Violation Detection

As mentioned, error detection was not the main focus in our experiments; we consider that, for error detection, runtime verification needs to be combined with test case generation. However, we still encountered unexpectedly many violations during the evaluation of JavaMOP. One reason is that many safety properties in our experiments were devised for checking performance, and are therefore not strictly required to hold in all programs. Consequently, many violations do not lead to actual errors in the program. For example, violations of the hasNext property were found in some Java library classes, e.g., AbstractCollection and TreeMap. It turned

out that these implementations use the size of the collection instead of the `hasNext` method to guard the iteration of elements. We also found violations indicating possible semantic problems of programs, which are subtle and thus difficult to find by ordinary testing. We next discuss some of these.

6.2.1 Potential Errors

There is a known problem in `jHotDraw` about using objects of `Enumeration`: one can edit a drawing, which may update a vector in the program, while making the animation for the drawing, which uses an enumerator of the vector. As expected, `JavaMOP` was able to find this problem.

We also found violations of some *interface contracts*, i.e., rules to use interfaces, in `Eclipse`. These can lead to resource leaks as pointed out in [27] and [38]. Three kinds of properties were checked in our `Eclipse` experiments:

1. The `dispose` method needs to be called to release acquired resources before a GUI widget is finalized.
2. The `remove*Listener` should be called by a host object to notify its listeners (registered by calling `add*Listener`) to release resources before it is finalized. `*` represents the name of the listener.
3. `Eclipse` uses `Lucene` [37] as its search engine; in `Lucene`, it is required that, before a `Dir` object is closed (by calling its `close` method), all the file readers created by the `Dir` object should be closed.

We instrumented the GUI package of `Eclipse` with these three properties and also the `JDT` package with the second property (note that there are many different `add*Listener`-`remove*Listener` pairs in these two packages). Then we used the instrumented `Eclipse` in our development work (no noticeable slow-down was experienced during the evaluation). More than 30 violations were detected in the GUI package, while none was found in the `JDT` package – this may indicate the importance of the second property. In summary, the GUI package, which is more complex and harder to test, seems less reliable w.r.t. to memory leaks.

6.2.2 Inappropriate Programming Practice

Several unexpected violations were encountered during our experiments. For example, we ran into some violations in `Xalan` [44] when checking a simple property about the `Writer` class in Java: no writes can occur after the writer is closed (by calling the `close` method). This is, according to the Java documentation which states that an exception should be raised, a must-have property. Despite these violations, no errors occurred in `Xalan`. Using `JavaMOP`, we located the places causing the violations without much insight of the program and a quick review showed that a pool of writer instances is used in `Xalan` to avoid unnecessary recreations, but the writer can be closed before it is returned to the pool. However, the program uses `StringWriter`, whose `close` method happens to have no effect. Although it is not

an error in this implementation, we believe that it is inappropriate programming practice: the writer should be cleared instead of closed when returned to the pool.

7. Discussion

In this section we discuss some important design decisions, as well as limitations, of `MOP`.

7.1 Incompleteness of Trace Logic

One of the most fundamental beliefs w.r.t. safety properties underlying the design of `MOP` is that there exists no “silver-bullet” logic for specifying all possible desired properties. When restricted to violation detection, runtime verification is more-or-less all about monitoring safety properties. There are as many safety properties as monitors, and safety properties are precisely the monitorable ones [42, 41]. However, it can be proved that there are as many safety properties as real numbers [41]. In other words, any particular formalism used to specify safety properties, be it regular expressions, extended regular expressions, temporal logics, context-free grammars, or even `Eagle` (the most powerful of all), is doomed to be incomplete, because these formalisms can only express as many safety properties as natural numbers. Therefore, although many runtime monitoring systems, e.g., `Tracematches` and `PQL`, focus on trace matching (i.e., validation detection), it is obvious that the universe of properties is significantly larger than what any logical formalism can express.

Knowing that completeness wrt safety properties cannot be achieved, `MOP` focused from the beginning on soundness within clearly stated limitations *and* on low runtime overhead. Whether the limitations are acceptable or not for everybody is a different issue, which applies to all runtime verification systems (due to their unavoidable incompleteness). Also, logic-independence is a very important factor influencing the design of `MOP`. Presently, if the logic plugin marks its monitor-creating events and those have all the parameters of the specification, then `MOP` can generate very efficient (and correct) monitoring code for that particular logic.

Admittedly, there may be trace properties that one cannot handle with our current logic-plugins and the parametric framework because of the limitations discussed below. But those properties are less common according to our experience and we have a backup for them: raw `MOP` specifications. Knowing the inherent incompleteness of logical formalisms, raw specifications are the only way to allow arbitrary monitoring strength (within the boundaries of Turing-computability) to an RV system. For example, the SQL injection safety property cannot be specified using any of our `MOP` logic-plugins, but there is a trivial raw `MOP` specification for it (Figure 8).

It is very tempting to design and develop powerful logics good for all purposes. It is intellectually extremely exciting to come up with monitor synthesis algorithms that gener-

ate as efficient monitors as one can get within that super-logic setting. However, if one’s property is not a “corner-case” in that logic’s universe, then one has to pay an unnecessary runtime overhead due to the generality of the general-purpose monitoring algorithm. For example, Eagle’s algorithm is based on term-rewriting, which is also applied when the property is a trivial regular expression, adding a non-necessary runtime overhead. The non-necessary runtime overhead is also seen in experiments: when monitoring the same property in the sublogic fragment, Eagle is slower than PQL, which is slower than Tracematches, which is slower than MOP[ERE,inline,validation]. One could, of course, have a bunch of different monitoring algorithms for the different fragments of the super-logic and enable them depending upon the input formula. But this essentially forfeits the point of having a super-logic. MOP builds upon the belief that there is no such super-logic. One can add as many logic-plugins as one wants, for different practical purposes. We may need to restrict the subset of properties expressed using a particular logic-plugin (when one wants to make use of our generic parameterization instead of developing one’s own universally quantified monitor) in order to maintain both sound and efficient monitoring, but, on the other hand, we impose no bound on the universe of properties that MOP can support.

7.2 Limitations of MOP and JavaMOP

The current MOP logic-plugins encapsulate monitor synthesis algorithms only for non-parametric trace logics. Even though the new MOP specification language allows universal parameters to be added to any of these logics, there is no way to add nested parameters, or existential ones. We intend to soon add a logic-plugin for Eagle [12], a “super-logic” generalizing both ERE and LTL, and also allowing arbitrary quantification and negation, but do not expect it to have a stimulating runtime overhead.

Our current JavaMOP implementation assumes that, in a parametric specification, the events marked by the logic-plugin to create monitor instances contain all the parameters of the specification. This limitation can be avoided by implementing a more complicated monitor creation strategy, as sketchily described in Figure 14; however, we were not motivated to it because all the properties that we have checked so far fall under this restriction.

In Figure 14, method `lookupMonitors` and method `lookupMetaMonitor` are functions searching for monitors or meta-monitors, respectively, according to a specific set of parameters. A meta-monitor for a set of parameter values is the monitor created specifically using that set of parameter values; after a monitor is created, `setMetaMonitor` can be called to connect it to the corresponding parameter set. Every monitor provides the method `update` to update its state according to an event and the method `clone` to make a copy of itself.

```

For an observed event e with a parameter set p

for each m in lookupMonitors(p) do
  m.update(e);
end for

if lookupMetaMonitor(p) == null then
  m = createMetaMonitor(p);
  m.update(e);
  for each possible parameters sets p' do
    if (p' is not a super set of p) then
      m = lookupMetaMonitor(p');
      if (m != null) then
        if (lookupMetaMonitor(p U p') == null) then
          m' = m.clone();
          m'.update(e);
          setMetaMonitor(m', p U p');
        end if
      end if
    end if
  end for
end if

```

Figure 14. High-level algorithm for partially instantiated monitors

The gap between dynamic events for monitoring and static monitor integration based on AOP can lead to some limitations of MOP tools. Ideally, for variable update events, the MOP tool should instrument all the updates of involved variables. But, statically locating all such updates requires precise alias analysis. Therefore, JavaMOP only allows update events for variables of primitive types. In addition, static instrumentation may cause extra performance penalty of monitoring. For the specification in Figure 4, one can see that the monitor is not “interested” in next events after `create` until an `updatesource` event is encountered. But since we instrument the program statically, the monitor keeps receiving next events even when they are not needed. These limitations may be relaxed by utilizing dynamic AOP tools, but more discussion on this direction is out of the scope of this paper. However, since MOP can also be used to add new functionality to a program, one may not want to miss any related event: some action may be executed even when the event does not affect the monitor state.

8. MOP at Work

Based on automatic code generation and program instrumentation, MOP provides powerful support for effectively applying runtime monitoring and recovery in software development to improve reliability. We next show a series of examples to illustrate the strengths of MOP in building reliable systems from different perspectives. All these examples use JavaMOP.

8.1 Improving Software Reliability via Recovery

Monitoring has been widely accepted in many engineering disciplines as an effective mechanism to improve the dependability and safety of systems, e.g., fuses in electricity and watchdogs in hardware. We argue that monitoring can

also play a key role in software development to obtain highly dependable systems, where MOP provides a fundamental support. In what follows, we demonstrate some applications of MOP that employ runtime monitoring and recovery to build reliable software.

```
class Controller {
  float input;
  /*@
  scope = class
  logic = JML
  {
  invariant input >= LOWERBOUND && input <= UPPERBOUND;
  }
  violation handler {
    if (input < LOWERBOUND) input = LOWERBOUND;
    else input = UPPERBOUND;
  }
  @*/
  ...
}
```

Figure 15. Specification to ignore bad sensors

Let us start with a simple example about survivability of control systems. For many control systems, it is more important to keep the system alive than always getting optimal results. For instance, when a system receives bad sensor signals, it usually ignores the signals and continues with a safe input value in order to avoid potential crashes caused by defective signals. Suppose that the control system is implemented in the `Controller` class, which uses the field `input` to receive the sensor signal. Figure 15 shows an MOP specification to automatically detect and filter out bad signals in the control system. This specification is defined as a class invariant for the `Controller` class, so it will be checked upon every update of `input`. JML is used to specify the expected range of the signal. When the property is violated, i.e., the signal is out of range, the violation handler is triggered to adjust the signal into the normal range, ensuring liveness of the control system.

This example may appear to be too simple since the developer has no difficulties in placing the checking and recovery code manually. However, there are still some advantages of using MOP here. First, the updates of `input` can be scattered into several components in the system, making manual insertion of checking code inefficient and error-prone. On the other hand, MOP provides a fully automated way to monitor the property throughout the system, reducing the programming efforts and improving the modularity of the program. Second, the formal specification of the property supported by MOP is more rigorous and clear than a concrete implementation, and is closer to requirements, facilitating program understanding and software maintenance. This advantage is fortified in the following examples, where more complicated properties are needed.

Runtime monitoring is particularly effective for detecting violations of safety properties, e.g., security policies. Violations of such properties usually do not lead to visible errors

of the system immediately, making them hard to catch by traditional testing and debugging. Besides, runtime recovery is highly desirable for such violations because they often cause serious damage to the system, such as malicious access to resources. MOP provides an effective means to enforce safety properties in software. A simple security example was shown in Figure 1. We next show another example.

Correct usage of a class interface sometimes requires to follow certain temporal constraints on the order of method invocations. For example, in Eclipse, when a GUI widget is released, one should use `dispose()` to release all the allocated resources. However, such constraints are not always forced by the system, although their violation may lead to unexpected problems eventually. For the widget example, many violations have been found in the Eclipse GUI package during our evaluation, implying possible resource leaks. Using MOP, one can enforce such constraints *without* changing the original program. Figure 16 gives the MOP specification that prevents resource leaks caused by undisposed widgets.

```
/*@
scope = global
logic = ERE
ToDispose (Widget w) {
  event create<w> : end(call(* w.new(...)));
  event dispose<w> : end(call(* w.dispose()));
  event finalize<w> : begin(call(* w.finalize()));
  formula : create finalize
}
validation handler {@this.dispose();}
@*/
```

Figure 16. MOP specification for enforcing disposal of Eclipse widgets

Three events are defined: `create` for the end of the creation of a widget, `dispose` for the end of the invocation of the widget's `dispose()` method, and `finalize` for the *beginning* of releasing the widget, to capture the violation *before* the code in `finalize` starts executing and thus to allow recovery. We describe the defective behavior instead of the desired property because it is simpler in this example, stating that we see `create` and then `finalize` without a `dispose` in between. By definition, `create` and `finalize` of a specific widget can occur at most once during the execution. A validation of the specified pattern indicates a violation of the desired property. A validation handler is used to correct the execution of the system, which simply invokes the `dispose()` method. This way, the constraint is enforced at runtime, avoiding the resource leak. This specification can also be written as a class invariant, since only one parameter is involved; the translation is trivial and ignored here.

Let us consider a more complex example. Cruise control is a common feature of most cars. It allows the driver to set a cruise speed during driving, and then the car control system will automatically maintain the speed by regulating the gas flow until the driver cancels the cruise mode. However, it is not always safe to use the cruise control mode. For example,

```

class CarController {
    int currentSpeed;
    ...
    int targetSpeed = 0;
    void setCruiseControl() {
        ... targetSpeed = currentSpeed; ...
    }
    void releaseCruiseControl() {
        ... targetSpeed = 0; ...
    }
    void doBrake();
}

```

Figure 17. Car controller class

```

/*@
scope = class
logic = FTLTL
{
    event setCC : end(exec(* setCruiseControl()));
    event releaseCC : end(exec(* releaseCruiseControl()));
    event outOfBound : end(update(int currentSpeed)) &&
        (currentSpeed > (targetSpeed + 5) ||
         currentSpeed < (targetSpeed - 5));
    formula : [] (setCC-> (!outOfBound U releaseCC));
}
violation Handler {
    @this.releaseCruiseControl();
    @RESET;
}
@*/

```

Figure 18. Specification for cruise control

if the car is running on a steep downhill or on wet ground, it may go faster than it should. In such case, the driver needs to retain the control of the car for safety reasons. This represents a rather common safety policy in many automation systems, e.g., automated flight systems: when unexpected situations are detected, the system should return the control to the operator.

There can be many variations of the cruise control function. We here focus on a simplified behavior; a more advanced version will be discussed in Section 8.2. The simplified cruise control behavior only concerns the action of setting and canceling the cruise mode and can be informally described as follows: “once the cruise control has been set, the car speed should not be 5 miles more than or less than the cruise speed until the cruise control is released.”

Suppose that the car control system is implemented in the `CarController` class in Figure 17, which contains the operations for starting/stopping the cruise control (`setCruiseControl()` and `releaseCruiseControl()`), as well as the fields for recording speeds. Figure 18 gives an MOP future time linear-temporal logic (using the logic-plugin FTLTL) specification to formally specify the desired behavior of the system. In this class-scoped specification, in addition to the two events that represent the actions of starting and stopping the cruise mode, another event is also defined to check the expected range of the car speed. Therefore, the monitoring code will be inserted after the two

cruise mode related methods, as well as after *every update* of `currentSpeed` to check if its value falls out of the range. In future time linear temporal logic (FTLTL), `[]` is interpreted as “always”, `->` and `!` are the normal boolean operators for “implies” and “not”, and `U` is the “until” operator, stating that the left operand should hold until the right operand holds. The MOP framework automatically synthesizes the monitoring code for this formula, which can be depicted as the state machine in Figure 19.




Figure 19. The state machine for safe cruise control system

When a violation is detected, the control system will interrupt the cruise mode and return the control to the driver. The `@RESET` keyword in the validation handler resets the state of the monitor, so the monitoring process continues.

Summary. The examples above illustrate that runtime monitoring and recovery can play a key role in developing reliable software, and that MOP can provide fundamental support for applying monitoring in software development. Its extensible formal framework allows the developer to choose appropriate formalisms to specify desired properties in an abstract and modular way, while the violation/validation handlers facilitate the implementation of desired runtime recovery.

8.2 Programming using Logical Aspects

MOP not only supports runtime monitoring and recovery, but also provides the developer with a means to program using logical aspects, triggered by sophisticated conditions expressed using logic formalisms. We next show some examples, illustrating the advantages of employing logical aspects in programming.

Let us start with a typical example of AOP, namely updating the display in a graphic application [26], and consider only a simple scenario here, that is, changing positions of points. In order to display the correct content, the display has to be updated whenever a point moves. Suppose that the point is implemented in a class `Point`, which uses fields `x` and `y` to represent its position. With AspectJ, one can implement an aspect that invokes the display update method after every method of `Point` that may change the position. However, when updating the display is costly, e.g., re-drawing a TV wall, it is desirable to make the update only when necessary, that is, when the point’s position *really* changes.

```

class Point{
  int x, y;
  /*@
  scope = interface
  logic = JML
  {
    ensures \old.x == x && \old.y == y;
  }
  violation handler {
    Display.update();
  }
  @*/
  ...
}

```

Figure 20. Efficient display updates

This requirement can also be implemented manually using aspects, though slightly more tediously, adding appropriate new variables to record the original position and statements to record and compare original and updated positions. However, MOP provides a trivial and compact solution to implement this more efficient strategy of updating the display, as shown in Figure 20. This specification is interface-scoped, stating that it will be executed on the boundaries of every public method of the class. This scope is chosen for simplicity; one can always associate this specification only to those methods that may change the position of the point. JML is used to specify the condition that may trigger the update of the display. `\old` is a JML keyword referring to the original state of the object before the execution of the method. So the specified formula essentially checks the original position and the updated position. If they are not equivalent, the display will be updated. Here the MOP specification acts like a complicated branch statement, whose condition refers to the history state of the object.

In MOP, specification and implementation are tightly coupled together: the implementation is constantly “supervised” and “corrected” by the specification, while the specification is “activated” by events generated by the implementation at various points that can be scattered all over the program. In other words, the specification can be regarded as a *logical aspect* of the implementation, that “becomes alive” wherever certain logical properties of interest hold. The display example above considered quite a trivial property, one that only needs to look one step back in order to check its validity. However, MOP can support through its logic-plugins much more complex properties, that refer to both past and future behaviors of programs. If used properly, we believe that this capability of MOP can be used as a powerful programming technique.

In other words, with the support of proper formalisms, MOP allows the developer to define trace related behaviors in the system, as discussed, e.g., in the profiling example in Figure 3. One advantage of using logical aspects in MOP is simplicity, both in understanding and in maintaining programs. Let us re-consider the cruise control example. The simplified cruise control system previously discussed only

takes operations on the cruise mode into account, but many other actions may happen under the cruise mode in practice. An important situation is when the driver brakes; in this case, the cruise control should also be stopped. This improved function can be implemented easily by MOP, as a slightly changed variant of the specification in Figure 18, shown in Figure 21.

```

scope = class
logic = FTLTL
{
  event setCC : end(exec(* setCruiseControl()));
  event releaseCC : end(exec(* releaseCruiseControl()));
  event brake : end(exec(doBrake()));
  event outOfBound : end(set(* currentSpeed)) &&
    (currentSpeed > (targetSpeed + 5) ||
     currentSpeed < (targetSpeed - 5));
  formula : setCC -> (!outOfBound U (releaseCC ++ brake));
}
violation handler{
  @this.releaseCruiseControl();
  @RESET;
}
validation handler {
  if (brake) @this.releaseCruiseControl();
  @RESET;
}

```

Figure 21. Specification for cruise control with brake

A new event, `brake`, is added to catch the braking action. The formula is changed to incorporate the `brake` event. More importantly, the “always” operator, `[]`, is removed to allow the validation of the formula to happen; in finite trace LTL, an “always” property will not be validated until the system stops. Hence the validation handler not only needs to cancel the cruise mode for the braking action, but also uses a `@RESET` action to restart the monitor. It also shows that the defined events and predicates can be used in the handlers to indicate the last event causing the violation/validation. In this specification, the formula plays the role of a complex trace-based condition that triggers either the violation handler or the validation handler in order to implement the desired behavior.

Summary. MOP combines specification and implementation by regarding the specification as an *logical aspect* of the implementation and triggering “recovery” code when validated or violated. The user is freed to focus on correctly and formally describing the actual requirements of the system rather than decomposing them into hard to check and error-prone implementation details. This way, MOP promotes an abstract “separation of concerns” for the software development and also facilitates program understanding and software maintenance.

9. Conclusion

We presented a generic, logic-independent approach to support parametric specifications in Monitoring-Oriented Programming (MOP). A novel optimization technique, called decentralized indexing, was proposed to reduce the runtime

overhead of monitoring parametric properties. A new, enriched MOP specification language was also proposed, that supports parameters and raw specifications; one can use raw MOP specifications to fully implement and control the desired monitoring process using the target programming language. An extensive evaluation of JavaMOP and comparisons with other runtime verification tools have been carried out; results are encouraging: less than 8% experiments showed more than 10% runtime overhead, and JavaMOP generated overall more efficient monitoring code than other runtime verification tools.

The techniques presented in this paper are purely dynamic. Although we showed that runtime verification is feasible, we also believe that static analysis can and should be used to further reduce the runtime overhead of monitoring: by statically analyzing the program against the desired property, one can eliminate irrelevant instrumentation points. Since static analysis is closely related to the particular logic-plugin, to add static analysis to MOP we will probably need *static-analysis-plugins* associated to logic-plugins. Also, MOP can be combined with test generation techniques to provide a more effective testing framework for safety properties.

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